Recent decentralization and forestry laws in Bolivia give municipal governments an important role in forest management. This paper analyzes the impact of those laws on local government activities related to logging, protected areas, indigenous territories, and land use planning. It concludes the laws have created new opportunities for indigenous people, small farmers, and small-scale timber producers to gain access to forest resources and influence forest policy, although they do not always take advantage of those opportunities. The paper identifies both positive and negative trends with regards to the laws' impact on resource management, although it is too early to draw firm conclusions.
Introduction
Decentralization and strengthening local government are flavors of the month. Add to that natural resource management and forests and you have a guaranteed best seller. Beyond the rhetoric, however, the available literature provides little empirical evidence about whether decentralization is good for forests and people who depend on them. This paper analyzes that issue in the context of Bolivia's recent efforts towards decentralization and its 1996 forestry law, which gives municipal governments a strong role in forest management.
Among possible advantages of decentralized natural resource management mentioned in the literature are that: management decisions can incorporate local knowledge about the resource base; it is easier to monitor resource utilization; local groups may feel a sense of ownership of rules regarding natural resource use and thus more compelled to abide by them; and poor and marginalized groups who lack effective national organizations may find it easier to influence policy if decisions are made locally. At the same time, local governments often lack technical expertise and administrative skills, are subject to political pressure and bribes from local resource users, and may not share national and international concerns with resource conservation (Brandon and Wells, 1992; Carney, 1995; Poffenberger, 1990; Utting, 1993) .
While it is still too early to draw firm conclusions, initial indications in Bolivia suggest that decentralization, along with other aspects of recent Forestry and Land Laws, have offered new opportunities for indigenous people and, to a lesser extent, small farmers and timber producers to access forest resources, restrict encroachment by large timber companies and ranchers, and influence policies affecting forests. This, combined with a new timber royalty system more favorable to municipal governments, will probably lead to more timber revenues remaining in local communities.
Little evidence suggests municipal forestry units will be better than their predecessors at controlling unsustainable logging and promoting sustainable forest management, but they probably won't be much worse, presuming they receive support from national and departmental governments and other groups. Local governments' present capacity for managing forests is minimal, but efforts are underway to overcome that. How successful municipalities are at managing forests will also depend in part on a newly created national Forestry Superintendency and local organization's own efforts to manage their forestry activities.
Conflicting pressures from groups who support and oppose restrictions on local access to resources for conservation purposes has made most municipal governments ambivalent about protected areas. Some municipalities have raised legitimate concerns regarding conservation projects which fail to benefit local communities. Only a few have actively supported forest protection.
Several municipalities have tried to plan local land use, but they have achieved few concrete results. Still, current local -level discussions about land use may yield long-term benefits. On the other hand, many municipalities invest a large portion of their revenues in road construction, and that may lead to greater deforestation. The paper is divided into seven sections. The first section provides background on forests and forest management in Bolivia. The second focuses on Bolivia's decentralization process and the role of municipal governments under the 1996 Forestry Law. The third section describes the struggles of local community groups and governments to influence forestry policies and gain greater access over forest resources prior to 1996. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections look at the municipalities' roles with respect to logging, protected areas, indigenous territories, and land use planning and road building respectively.
Tropical Forests and Forest Management in Bolivia
Forests cover approximately half of Bolivia, or some 50 million hectares. Eight percent of these are located under 500 meters above sea level, mostly in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, La Paz, and Pando (López, 1993) . i Cochabamba has tropical forests located at slightly higher altitudes.
Commercial logging in Bolivia became important in the 1970s, and has expanded rapidly in recent years. In 1994, Bolivia exported over $112 million in primary and processed forest products. Four species, mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla), cedar (cedrela sp.), oak (Amburana cearensis), and ochoó (Hura crepitans) account for 60% of the wood produced between 1985 and 1994 and an even larger percentage of exports (Quiroga and Salinas, 1996) .
As of 1994, the Bolivian government had assigned 185 logging areas, covering almost 21 million hectares to 173 timber companies (Quiroga and Salinas, 1996) , although less than 100,000 hectares are actually logged each year (Anderson, Constantino, and Kishor, 1995) .
In total, perhaps 30 municipalities have major logging activity. (See appendix.) Santa Cruz had 72% of the assigned logging area, Beni 16%, and La Paz 10% (Quiroga and Salinas, 1996 Until recently, the Bolivian Forestry Service ("Centro de Desarrollo Forestal" or CDF) was responsible for ensuring timber companies complied with forestry regulations and followed forestry management plans. In reality, however, the CDF's principal concern was collecting timber royalties, and it did little to encourage sustainable forest management. Corruption and illegal logging practices were widespread.
Brazil nuts collection and processing are the main income sources in several municipalities in Pando and in Vaca Diez province in Beni. These areas export $10-15 million of Brazil nuts annually. Both medium and large -size barracas (camps) and independent rural families collect brazil nuts, but the activity is largely controlled by the barracas and larger brazil nut processors.
In 1996, the Bolivian Congress passed a new Forestry Law which changed government policy towards logging. Previously, most logging areas had been assigned on a short-term basis and could not be sold or transferred. Now, forty year forest concessions will be granted, which can be renewed if concessionaires comply with logging regulations, and can be sold and inherited. Companies which already have logging areas can convert them to concessions. Private land owners and indigenous peoples with legally recognized territories will have the right to exploit forest resources on their land for the first time, although they still must pay a royalty based on the area logged and follow an approved forest management plan.
ii
The law replaces all volume-based timber taxes with an area-based royalty of at least $1 per hectare for timber and .30¢ per hectare for non-timber forest products, such as brazil nuts.
This gives loggers an incentive to reduce their concession size and, as a result, it appears the area controlled by timber companies has declined from 21 million hectares to five or six million hectares. Public forests which existing logging area holders fail to converted to forest concessions will be auctioned off to other timber companies or made available for logging by local community groups.
Bolivian forests have also been affected by conversion of forests to fields and pastures.
Before the mid-1980s, Bolivia had low deforestation rates, but this is changing. to a "March for Territory and Dignity" in 1990, which helped convince, Jaime Paz Zamora, the president at the time, to issue a decree establishing four indigenous territories (Liberman and Godinez, 1992) . Later the government recognized five additional territories, making a total of nine territories covering 2.5 million hectares (Quiroga and Salinas, 1996) . These territories are largely located in the same provinces as logging and protected areasBallivián, Yacuma, and Moxos in Beni, Nuflo de Chávez in Santa Cruz, and Iturralde in La Paz -and there is significant overlap, and conflict between the three types of land rights and utilization. In 1996, the Bolivian Congress established a new land law, which mandates the government to delineate and title indigenous communal lands, but this has yet to happen.
As the previous discussion implies, most forested lowland municipalities have numerous, often -conflicting, interest groups, who can potentially influence local governments. These include: large and small loggers, small and large farmers of different ethnic origins, ranchers, brazil nut collectors, indigenous people's organizations, environmental and development NGOs, merchants, local service providers, and government officials, among others.
Although not all of these groups directly exploit forest resources, they all influence municipal government's behavior with respect to forest management.
The Struggle for Local Control Over Forest Resources prior to 1996
For much of the last fifty years, Bolivia has been characterized by strong regional movements that struggle to increase their region's share of national revenues. These movements seek greater participation in policy formulation, national funding for highway and rail road projects, and the allocation of part of the royalties from petroleum, natural gas, mineral, and timber exploitation to the regions where these activities occur.
The "Committee for Santa Cruz", commonly referred to as the "civic committee", has helped lead these movements and was established in 1957 (Sandoval, 1985) . It includes representatives of business, trade, and professional groups, social organizations, and local government, has independent chapters in each province, and is a powerful force within the department. Beni established similar committees in 1967 (Navia, 1989) .
Within this context, in 1979, local civic committees and governments in San Borja and San
Ignacio de Moxos in Beni began a struggle to increase the benefits for local communities from logging by large companies from Santa Cruz. To press their demands, they blocked roads and conducted other types of protests (Navia, 1989) .
The social forces behind these movements cannot be easily characterized. A wide range of groups within Beni resented outside logging companies exploiting the department and the national government neglecting it. Many community, trade, social, and professional organizations with no material interest in logging participated in these efforts, whose sincerity there is no reason to doubt. Other key movement participants were from the traditional Benian ranching elite and may have been partly motivated by a desire to increase their own access to Beni's timber and limit outside competition.
Eventually, the movement in Beni and other areas led to the creation, in 1982, of an 11% timber royalty to be used for regional development. In Beni, the companies began paying the royalty soon after it was announced. Local offices collected the revenues and used them to finance infrastructure and services in timber producing provinces. In Santa Cruz and other departments, however, payment did not begin until several years later, control over the funds was centralized in the departmental capital, and funds were often not for local development.
In those departments local inhabitants continued to complain of insufficient benefits from logging in their regions.
In the mid-1980s, Beni was again at the forefront, in an effort to decentralize the national forest service (CDF) and create a departmental forestry policy. This initiative grew out of a 1985 symposium on "Forestry Resources and Regional Development in Beni" and involved the Beni congressional delegation, local governments, civic committees, chamber of forestry, university, and others. Following the symposium, the government of Beni established an inter-institutional forestry commission to formulate a regional forestry policy, and that policy was later sanctioned by a departmental decree. Among the commission's proposals were: 1)
to increase the physical presence of the departmental forestry service, make it more autonomous, and put it under the control of a departmental board of directors, and 2) to allow logging in one of the department's largest forests, the Chimanes forest, but only under strict regulations designed to make it a model of sustainable forest management (Navia, 1989) .
The movement in Beni to decentralize the CDF used frequent demonstrations and other pressure tactics and was accompanied by a similar effort in Santa Cruz. Together they achieved the deconcentration and partial decentralization of the two departmental CDFs in 1986. However, these changes failed to make the CDFs more efficient or effective. The institution continued to have a reputation for being corrupt, overly politicized, and ineffective (Quiroga and Salinas, 1996) .
During the 1990s, the regional movements' main focus shifted from Beni to Santa Cruz and northern La Paz. Local governments and civic committees in those areas demanded greater support from departmental governments and timber companies and established road blocks to collect fees from passing timber trucks.
These conflicts, along with many logging companies' failure to pay their timber royalties on time, led the government and logging companies of Santa Cruz to agree in 1993 that logging companies would pay 80% of their timber royalties in-kind directly to the provinces where logging occurred. This permitted companies to provide tangible benefits to local communities, while at the same time reducing their costs by inflating the declared worth of goods and services provided (Quiroga and Salinas, 1996) .
One province where local government -timber company conflicts were particularly strong was Ixiamas, in northern La Paz. In 1992, the province tried to expel all timber companies, arguing the companies had failed to benefit local communities. The forestry chamber (CNF) responded that the local government had been taken over by illegal chain saw operators, who were simply seeking to eliminate their competition.
Decentralization, Popular Participation, and the 1996 Forestry Law
Bolivia took its first important step towards decentralization in the late 1970s, with the creation of departmental development corporations. These corporations' income came mostly from petroleum, gas, mineral, and timber royalties and the national treasury and by 1992, they had a combined investment budget of $114 million (Blanes, 1993) . The corporations were much stronger in Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija, where they received most of their royalties from natural gas and petroleum. They remained weak in poorer departments, such as Beni and Pando.
The corporations initiated the first serious regional planning at the departmental level and provided the Lowland elite opportunities to influence policy. However, they remained under the control of the central government. Their boards of directors included representatives of local civil society, but the national government named their presidents. There were (and are) no popular elections at the departmental level.
During this period, the departmental government (prefect)'s role was to represent the national government in the region and maintain public order. Their participation in most technical issues was marginal.
Then, in the mid-1990s, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada made decentralization a center piece of his policies. Consequently, in 1994, the Bolivian Congress passed a "Popular Participation" law, that fundamentally altered the role of municipal governments. The law expanded municipal governments' jurisdiction beyond the urban centers to the entire territory covered by provincial sections (Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1994). It made municipalities responsible for local schools, health facilities, roads, and water systems. To finance these new responsibilities, it allocated 20% of the national budget to the municipal governments, with each government receiving an amount proportional to its population.
Rural and urban property taxes were also earmarked for the municipal governments, who now administer their collection.
The law sought to introduce community control over municipal governments by recognizing base level organizations ("organizaciones territoriales de base" or OTBs) in each community, and permitting them to influence municipal investment decisions and elect oversight committees to monitor municipal finances. Local farmer organizations, neighborhood committees, and indigenous groups become OTBs by simply registering as such.
The Popular Participation Law strengthened municipal governments and made them more democratic. Municipal budgets grew dramatically and the rural population gained the right to participate in municipal elections. In many Lowland municipalities, small farmers and indigenous people were elected to office for the first time, representing different political parties.
iii The changes also gave municipal governments more political power and strengthened their bargaining position with other actors.
Since the law was enacted, municipalities have devoted their energies mostly to education, health, roads, urban infrastructure, and water supply. Nationally, these areas received over 90% of their investments in 1995. Only 1-2% of their budgets went to natural resource management or agricultural activities (Rojas, 1996) .
The Popular Participation Law does not give municipal governments any explicit new functions related to natural resource management. iv Nevertheless, it contributed to some municipal governments becoming increasingly involved in natural resource issues.
In 1995, a second law on Administrative Decentralization changed the role of the departmental governments (prefects). That law abolished the departmental development corporations and transferred their responsibilities to the prefects, who are now expected to be involved in more technical issues, as well as maintain public order. It also created councils to oversee the prefects, elected by the municipal councils from each province.
The Popular Participation and Administrative Decentralization Laws contributed to a political climate in which it was politically viable to propose giving municipal governments a strong role in forest management. In the debates leading up to the 1996 Forestry Law, congressional representatives disagreed sharply about how much to decentralize public forestry administration, but ultimately they gave municipal governments an unprecedented amount of resources and power. Under the new law and accompanying regulations, municipal governments will receive 25% of royalties ("patentes") from forest concessions to be used to promote sustainable utilization of forest resources and for social infrastructure.
They will also manage up to 20% of public forests as municipal forest reserves for use by local groups and have a role in ensuring timber concessions and sawmills comply with forestry regulations.
To carry out their responsibilities, municipal governments are expected to create municipal forestry units within six months after receiving their first timber royalties. These units can be created either by individual municipalities or groups of municipalities ("mancomunidades") and are supposed to identify and request areas for municipal forest reserves, help decide who to allocate those forests to, help local organizations prepare forest management plans, monitor compliance with forestry regulations and existing management plans, promote forest plantations and agro-forestry, and maintain a register of forest plantations and natural forests in private lands within their jurisdiction. If the municipalities fail to create forestry units, they can be deprived of access to timber royalties and their forestry functions revert to the national government.
The 1996 Forestry Law also creates a new independent national Forest Superintendency, modeled after government regulatory bodies in the financial sector, which is responsible for allocating forest concessions and municipal forest reserves and supervising them. This superintendency is supposed to help determine the municipal governments' exact functions and monitor their performance. Municipal governments who suspect timber concessions of violating forestry regulations are generally expected to request the Forest Superintendency to intervene, rather than do so themselves.
Under the new system, the process of assigning public forest lands to local community groups begins with the mapping and classification of all public forest lands by the Ministry of Sustainable and Development and Environment (MDSMA). Once this is done, the MDSMA, in collaboration with municipal governments, must provide the Forest Superintendency a list of areas suitable for municipal forest reserves. Then the municipal councils propose who the forests should be assigned to, this is approved by municipal oversight committees, and the Forest Superintendency assigns the forests to those groups. Once existing concessionaires of logging areas declare which areas they will retain under the new system, municipalities get the first opportunity to claim their portion of unassigned public forest lands.
The following four sections look at the specific role of municipal governments with regards to timber production, protected areas, indigenous territories, and land use planning.
Local Governments and Logging
Some municipalities became involved in logging issues even before the 1996 Forestry Law was passed, often entering into conflict with logging companies. In certain instances, this Situations such as these have led the Chamber of Forestry (CNF) to oppose a role for local governments in forest management. They believe many municipalities are controlled by chain saw operators, small farmers, and other local groups hostile towards timber companies, who these groups perceive as outsiders (Avila, p.c. In summary, lowland municipal governments are currently poorly equipped to handle forestrelated matters, but those with substantial timber resources tend to be interested in the topic, and may be able to obtain training and advice from foreign-financed projects and NGOs.
They have an incentive to obtain as much income from timber royalties as they can, but may also enter into conflict with absentee logging companies, who are considered outsiders by local communities. Conflicts and competing land claims over forest resources among different groups within municipalities remain unsolved and their implications uncertain.
Protected Area Management
No law in Bolivia gives municipal governments an explicit role in protected area management. Existing legislation centralizes control over protected areas in the National The ambivalence or indifference displayed by these municipal governments contrasts sharply with the positions adopted by local representatives of the departmental governments (sub-prefects). The latter consistently follow national government orders, and on several occasions have arrested small farmers for encroaching on protected areas or protesting against conservation -based restrictions (Crespo, p.c.).
On the other hand, in a few cases municipal governments have actively promoted protected areas. The clearest example of this is the Kaa-iya National Park, created in response to demands from the Izoceño and managed by them. There, the traditional Izoceño authorities, organized in a Capitanía, control the local municipal district, and are represented in the municipal government of Charagua, of which their district forms part. On a much smaller scale, the government of Urubichá in Santa Cruz, which is controlled by Guarayos has protected a local lagoon and created a "botanical reserve", in response to perceived threats from outside tourist companies (Tejada p.c.). In El Torno, Santa Cruz, the local mayor prohibited a local community from charging entrance fees to a local water fall, but now wants the municipality to manage that area itself (Crespo p.c.).
In summary, municipal governments have become increasingly involved in issues concerning protected areas. The positions they take depend largely on the organizational capacity and resources of the groups who support and oppose these areas and local official's own material interests. Conflicting pressures from different local groups have led many municipalities to take ambivalent or contradictory positions on this issue.
Indigenous Territories
Many protected areas also overlap with indigenous territories, and this has created confusion regarding indigenous people's right to manage resources in those areas, and conflicts Development of Indigenous Peoples of Beni (PRODESIB). These agencies' combined efforts may further increase the probability that natural resources in the indigenous territories will be sustainably managed.
In summary, indigenous people's participation in municipal governments is one of several factors which has strengthened their territorial claims and help defend their natural resources from undesired encroachment. Indigenous territorial rights do not guarantee sustainable resource management, but they may increase the chances for it, particularly with support from indigenous organizations, NGOs, and donor projects.
Land Use Planning and Road Construction
In theory, the Bolivian government is committed to land use planning. It has established a Another important way municipal governments can affect land use is through their investments in rural roads. Road construction and maintenance is one of the most widespread demands of the rural populations in these municipalities, and municipal governments dedicate substantial attention to building and maintaining roads and pressuring national and departmental agencies to do so.
In the long run, municipal support for road construction may yield the most negative impact of the decentralization process on forests. Past experience with road building in forested areas, both in Bolivia and other countries, shows that it generally leads to increased deforestation (Chomitz and Gray, 1995; Liu, Iverson, and Brown, 1993; Ludeke, 1987; Royden and Wennergren, 1993; Sader and Joyce, 1988) . This problem is particularly intractable since roads are essential for providing many rural people with access to markets and social services, and it is usually difficult to control nearby forest conversion once they are built. Theoretically, land use planning might help solve this problem, but in practice, this seems unlikely.
Conclusions
This paper addresses two central questions: Does strengthening municipal governments in Bolivia favor a more equitable distribution of political power and the benefits from forest resources, and does it favor a more sustainable management of those resources?
The Bolivian experience to date shows that strengthening the role of local governments in forest management can lead to greater equity and (perhaps) even more sustainable resource use. It also shows that these outcomes are by no means assured. Without strong support and supervision by national agencies, foreign donors, and private organizations, local governments are unlikely to manage resources appropriately, and may make existing problems worse.
Decentralization in Bolivia has created new opportunities for indigenous people, small farmers, and small -scale timber producers. Many representatives of these groups have been elected to public office for the first time or expect to be in the future. The municipal governments they form part of are more powerful. The allocation of up to 20% of public forests for local community groups and rights over forest resources within their lands and territories potentially represent an important opportunity for these groups, and rural municipalities have gained direct control over a portion of timber royalties. The process has also contributed, at least marginally, to a broader trend towards official recognition of indigenous territorial rights.
Pre-existing local elites have not lost their power. Most forested municipalities are still dominated by local merchants, professionals, ranchers, and saw mill operators.
Strengthening municipal governments, strengthens these elite groups as well. Nevertheless, they are under increasing pressure to acknowledge the presence of groups who were previously marginalized and negotiate with them. The door has also been opened for those groups to win even greater power in the future. In certain cases, the rise of local governments has also weakened the influence of non-resident elites, such as absentee forest concessionaires, sawmill owners, and large ranchers.
Since ranchers, and timber producers whose current production systems tend to degrade the forests have great influence in local municipal governments, those governments are unlikely to become strong proponents of restricting these activities. In those cases where municipal governments are willing to enforce regulations, they still lack the technical capacity and financial resources to do so. To date, their principal interest in forest management has been to gain greater access to timber royalties and their relation to protected areas has generally been ambivalent. The growing power and resources of municipal governments may also lead to greater deforestation in forested areas, as a result of increased investments of road construction and maintenance.
Thus, it would definitely be premature to conclude that giving municipal governments a greater role in forest -related issues contributes to forests being managed more sustainably, as the heterogeneity and diversity of interests among different groups in many municipalities introduces an element of uncertainty. However, in specific instances, municipal governments have shown a willingness to promote forest management, reforestation, nature conservation, and land use planning, and if they receive the appropriate training, resources, and incentives perhaps they could move farther in that direction.
This would require greater support for municipal natural resource manage efforts from national and departmental governments than has been forthcoming so far. In the future, municipal governments will need to depend heavily on the Forestry Superintendency, MDSMA, prefects, and other government agencies for information about forest concessions, guidelines about their own activities, support in conflicts between municipal forestry units and timber producers, training, and financial resources. They can receive some, but definitely not, all the support they require from forestry projects and NGOs; the rest must come from higher levels of government.
As noted earlier, decentralization in Bolivia is still in a very early stage, and a great deal can be learned from studying how it evolves. Some key questions which this initial study suggests that will be important to follow include:
1) How will national and departmental government agencies treat municipal involvement in forest-related issues, and why?
2) What factors influence whether specific municipalities develop competent, honest, municipal forestry units?
3) To what extent do municipal forestry activities incorporate the participation of local forest users and respond to their concerns? 4) Can governmental, NGO, and project support for municipal governments and forest users overcome these groups' current weakness with respect to sustainable forest management? ii Under the previous law, landowners did not have rights over the trees on their properties.
This led to frequent overlapping claims and conflicts between those with land rights and those with rights to timber. Overlapping claims among loggers and among farmers were (and are still) also common.
iii Municipalities where indigenous people were elected mayor or municipal council member include: Ascención, Charagua, Concepción, El Puente, and Urubichá. Small farmer representatives were elected in Chimore, San Julián, Santa Rosa, Puerto Villaroel, Villa
Tunarí, and Yapacaní, among others.
iv The previous (1985) municipality law had already given local governments a vague responsibility for "preserving the environment, controlling pollution, and maintaining ecological balances".
v The municipality of San Ignacio de Velasco, which probably has the largest area in forest concessions in Bolivia, calculates they will receive $200,000 in timber concession royalties in
1997.
vi This may be the case, for example, of some of the boundary disputes between
Rurrenabaque and San Borja in Beni.
vii Puerto Suarez and San Ignacio de Velasco budgeted $20,000 and $28,000 respectively for this activity in 1997. San Ignacio refers to its office as an "agro-forestry" office and it will also help implement the Land Law passed in 1996.
viii The $200,000 was not formally a donation, but rather resulted from an agreement between FAN, the municipality, and a logging company, that FAN would pay the municipality back debts owed by company if the company would relinquish its rights over an area within the Noel Kempff Mercado park. The legal standing of this agreement is unclear, as the municipal government has no formal right over past royalties.
ix Bolivia's new land law and the indigenous people's negotiations with the national government have also helped strengthen their territorial rights, and have probably been more important than decentralization in this regard.
